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Abstract: In location-based services of continuous query, it is easier than snapshot to confirm whether a location belongs to a particular user, because sole location can be 
composed into a trajectory by profile correlation. In order to cut off the correlation and disturb the sub-trajectory, an un-detective region called mix-zone was proposed. 
However, at the time of this writing, the existing algorithms of this type mainly focus on the profiles of ID, passing time, transition probability, mobility patterns as well as road 
characteristics. In addition, there is still no standard way of coping with attacks of correlating each location by mining out query content and time interval from the sub-
trajectory. To cope with such types of attack, users have to generalize their query contents and time intervals similarity. Hence, this paper first provided an attack model to 
simulate the adversary correlating the real location with a higher probability of query content and time interval similarity. Then a user collaboration mix-zone (CoMix) that can 
generalize these two types of profiles is proposed, so as to achieve location privacy. In CoMix, each user shares the common profile set to lowering the probability of success 
opponents to get the actual position through the correlation of location. Thirdly, entropy is utilized to measure the level of privacy preservation. At last, this paper further 
verifies the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed algorithm by experimental evaluations. 
 





Nowadays, along with the development of location-
based services (LBSs), the request for continuous service 
becomes more popular than snapshot one, such as finding 
the nearest gas station along this road or tell me the Italian 
restaurant every 5 minutes during my routing. In this type 
of service, users can obtain a series of responses from the 
LBS server, and enjoy a convenient journey or a pleasant 
leisure time by only submitting one query. However, as 
users generate a good deal of location-related data during 
the service, if failure to cope with, it will be possible for 
the adversary to compose these locations into a trajectory 
with time series. As trajectory contains more spatial-
temporal information than discrete ones, so the adversary 
has the possibility to infer the regulation of a particular user, 
and mine out the privacy (e.g. user's home or work place). 
As a result, the adversary will bring some bothersome 
things in daily life or even some security problems, such as 
tracking or robbery. 
In order to cope with the problem of preserving 
trajectory, many algorithms have been proposed in the past 
few years. These algorithms can be classified into two main 
categories: the whole trajectory disturbance [1-4] and the 
subsequent location generalization [5-10]. As sub-
trajectories can be obtained before preserving, the 
adversary may infer the location correlation and identify 
the real trajectory from the anonymous group, which 
makes algorithms of whole trajectory disturbance failed. 
Thus, this paper mainly focuses on algorithms of 
subsequent location generalization. In order to generalize 
subsequent locations, different algorithms based on 
obfuscation as well as disturbance are provided. In types of 
obfuscation, Ma et al. [9] obfuscated the correlation with 
anchors, and cloaked the query content and time interval 
with users around the anchor’s vicinity. Schlegel et al. [10] 
utilized a user-define privacy grid, and obfuscated the 
requested point of interests (PoIs) with randomly chosen 
cells. However, both of them assume that users are 
equipped with a powerful computational device and can 
cope with the poor quality of service. 
To reduce the computational complexity and improve 
the service quality, algorithms based on disturbance were 
proposed [7, 11, 12]. In this type, algorithms usually 
disturb the real location by other k-1 users with the help of 
a trusted third party (TTP) to achieve k-anonymity [13]. 
Though these algorithms can provide a security service, the 
process of establishing a cloak region for continuous 
locations is extremely complex. It makes researchers turn 
to another scheme with a lower complexity [8]. A mix-zone 
can be seen as a black region with no information that can 
be detected from outside. After ID transformation, the 
adversary becomes difficult to track subsequent locations 
of users through ID correlation. Palanisamy et al. further 
optimized the mix-zone with delay-tolerant and non-
rectangular structure [5, 6], and their algorithms can resist 
the timing and transition attacks as well as query 
correlation attack. However, as it can monitor the whole 
process of servicing, the adversary can obtain a sub-
trajectory of the user before entering the mix-zone, and 
infer the query content and time interval from it. Then with 
these two profiles, the adversary can correlate locations of 
a particular user with the similarity comparison. 
Furthermore, with these identified locations, the adversary 
can reconstitute the whole trajectory and gain even more 
privacy.  
The aims of this paper can be described as to resist the 
potential correlation attack, take advantage over the 
collaborative user scheme [14, 15] and achieve the query l-
diversity [16] and time interval consistency. Based on these 
purposes, a user collaborative mix-zone (short for CoMix) 
is proposed. In this algorithm, query content and time 
interval are exchanged with other collaborative users in the 
same mix-zone, then each user is restricted to share the 
same query set and time interval. Once leaving this zone, 
the similarity of these two profiles will disturb the 
correlation between the sub-trajectory and subsequent 
locations. Therefore, the adversary will be difficult to 
confirm any location through the profile correlation attack. 
At last, compared with existing algorithms, our algorithm 
has the following features: 
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• No TTP is required. The whole process of achieving 
anonymity in mix-zone (e.g. query content and time 
interval transform) is implemented with collaborative 
users. 
• We propose a scheme to resist the query content 
correlation attack as well as time intervals correlation 
attack. As the mix-zone cuts off the correlation with 
the shared similar profile by generalizing all users with 
the same query set and time interval. 
• CoMix can provide a lower computational complexity 
and better service quality. As users no longer had to 
compute the nearest PoI and request services by their 
real locations, there is only a little computation in 
mobile devices and no redundant information feedback. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 presents the related work. Some preliminaries of our 
works are proposed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the 
process of CoMix algorithm and shows its security. 
Finally, evaluation results and conclusions are shown in 
Sections 5 and 6, respectively. 
 
2 RELATED WORK 
 
Location privacy is one of the most popular topics 
studied over the past decade, plenty of algorithms have 
been proposed. Based on the service type, the proposed 
algorithms can be roughly divided into two main categories: 
the snapshot location preservation as well as continuous 
preservation. In order to preserve the privacy in snapshot 
services, Gruteser et al. [13] imported k-anonymity from 
the data dissemination to obfuscate the user with at least k-
1 users, so that the adversary can hardly identify a 
particular user. Gedik et al. [17] expanded the uncertainty 
by submitting a cloaking region. Bhuvan et al. [18], Liu et 
al. [16] and Wang et al. [19] considered the simplicity of k-
anonymity is not enough and proposed the diversity of 
location, query and road segment respectively.  
However, as TTP may become the single point of 
privacy preservation provider, users usually concern about 
whether this entity can leak the information in commercial 
objectives or breached by the adversary. As a result, 
algorithms without TTP were proposed. Based on 
cryptography, Ghinita et al. [20] proposed a computable 
private information retrieval (PIR) algorithm to provide 
zero information leakage retrieval. Khoshgozaran et al. 
[21] eased this process with a hardware-based PIR. Lien et 
al. [22] utilized a public-key homomorphic cryptosystem 
to achieve zero information leakage k-nearest neighbors 
(kNN) finding. Although these algorithms can provide 
privacy preservation services to users, they are obstructed 
by the complexity of computation and updating, so this 
paper only focuses on algorithms of user collaboration. The 
user collaboration scheme is firstly proposed by 
establishing group through P2P [23], then Chow et al. [24] 
remedied the drawback of the initiator usually locating in 
the center of collaborative users. Rebollo et al. [14] further 
this conception in query anonymity, and utilized entropy to 
select the optimal submitting user [25]. Niu et al. [15] 
proposed a Variance-Based Attack (VBA) to successfully 
attack the existing algorithms, then they proposed a 
random walk-based cloaking algorithm to remedy 
drawbacks of these algorithms. 
Along with the development of LBSs technology, 
more and more people become willing to enjoy continuous 
LBSs than snapshot ones. This type of fashion makes 
privacy preservation of user collaboration no longer 
efficient, because they often submit queries with certain 
time delays. Thus, researchers have to go back to TTP for 
finding solutions and solutions of [1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 26, 27] 
are able to be classified into two categories: whole 
trajectory disturbance and subsequent locations 
generalization. As the adversary can obtain user's sub-
trajectory, algorithms of the whole trajectory disturbance 
are less suitable for continuous LBSs, so algorithms of 
subsequent locations generalization prosperous. Among 
these algorithms, mix-zone performs best, because mix-
zone can lower the computational complexity and provide 
a balance between privacy and service quality. 
The mix-zone can be seen as a black region with no 
information that can be detected by outsiders. After users' 
ID transformation, the adversary can no longer track 
subsequent locations of a particular user through ID 
correlation [8]. Freudiger et al. [28] introduced this scheme 
for location privacy in vehicular networks, and optimized 
it with less deployment number [29]. Le et al. [30] 
improved the effectiveness of mix-zone with dynamic 
deployment. Palanisamy et al. [5, 6, 31, 32] further this 
scheme with delay-tolerant and non-rectangular structure, 
which made the mix-zone able to resist such as timing 
attack, transition attack and continuous query correlation 
attack. Gao et al. [33] utilized this scheme in participatory 
sensing. Sun et al. [34] further optimized the deployment 
of mix-zone. However, just as Palanisamy had mentioned, 
there is no mix-zone completely free from the correlation 
query attack. To address this issue, this paper focuses on 
query content and time interval correlation, and utilizes a 
mix-zone to cut off this correlation to preserve the privacy. 
Different from most of current mix-zone algorithms, 
CoMix utilizes the collaborative user to share query 
content and time interval, so as to reduce the utilization of 
TTP to less the deployment cost. 
 
3 PRELIMINARIES 
3.1 Adversaries and Threat Model 
 
The goal of the adversary is to obtain the sensitive 
information of a particular user through the whole 
trajectory, but this aim is obstructed by the undetectable 
profile transformation in mix-zone. In this zone, the 
adversary cannot take a statistic of how many users are in 
it, when and where users leave, and even how users change 
ID. In order to get the privacy, the adversary has to seek 
help from the sub-trajectory before preserved. As the sub-
trajectory may contain the query content and time interval 
of the whole trajectory, user's subsequent locations can be 
identified by computing the higher probability based on the 
similar level between them. Formally, the adversary can 
compute (,( ) ),( | ( , ))c t c tL lPr l T sim p p∈ to guess the real 
location l by the similarity between sub-trajectory and l 
where T indicates the whole trajectory of a particular user, 
and the sub-trajectory L belongs to T, c and t denote the 
query content and time interval. When guessing the real 
location, the adversary can utilize the Bayes' rule to 
calculate the probability with the following formula. 
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For example, in Fig. 1, there are two trajectories of 
Alice and Bob. Assume that Alice queries for the nearest 
gas station and Bob queries for the restaurant. Although 
their trajectories are disturbed by mix-zone deployed in n6, 
query contents of them are not changed. As the adversary 
may gain the sub-trajectories between n5-n6 and n9-n6, the 
request for gas station is denoted as triangles and the 
request for restaurants as pentagons may be mined out, so 
the real location with these contents will be correlated. The 
















Figure 1 The query content correlation  
 
In this work, the LBS server is directly considered as 
an adversary, as he is able to monitor the whole process of 
service, and stores all information of applicants. The LBS 
server can even combine a sub-trajectory with some un-
preserved locations, and mine out the query content and 
time interval. Additionally, as the LBS server can pretend 
to be a user, he may also know the strategy used in the 
preservation algorithm. At last, collaborative users are 
considered as trusted entities, because the query content 
and time interval are all shared with each user in the 
collaborative users group. 
 
3.2 Anonymity Metric 
 
The Jaynes’ rationale [35] on maximum entropy 
methods enables to measure the uncertainty modeled by a 
probability distribution by means of its Shannon entropy. 
In general, maximum entropy can be achieved by each user 
has the same probability to be treated as the real one. As 
the mix-zone cut off the correlation between sub-trajectory 
and uncertain locations, the degree of user hidden behind 
uncertain users can be reflected by the probability of failure 
to guess the real location. Thus, the maximum entropy can 
be used to measure anonymity degrees of users, and 
evaluate the optimal scheme with higher entropy. 
To compute the entropy, the probability of a location 
belonging to a confirmed trajectory is used, and this 
probability is computed by the similarity of query content 
and time interval. In this paper, this probability is denoted 
as pri, and the sum of all probabilities pri is 1. Then assume 
there are at least k users in the set of uncertainty, the 
privacy level of a user hidden behind other users with the 




H i pr pr= −∑                                                (2) 
 
Since higher entropy means a better privacy level, the 
aim of CoMix is to achieve the maximum entropy. From 
Eq. (2), the maximum entropy happens when all the k 
possible users have the same probability to be correlated as 
the real user. Thus, in order to resist the correlation attack, 
an algorithm has to let each user show the same query 
content and time interval. 
 
3.3 Motivation and Basic Idea 
 
Because the real location of the user can be guessed by 
the highest probability through the similarity of query 
content and time interval, the basic motivation of 
preserving user's privacy is to reduce the probability of real 
location been confirmed to a sub-trajectory or to reduce the 
similarity of each profile, but it is hard to achieve any of 
them. Therefore, in order to resist the correlation attack, the 
researcher has to seek another scheme. In the set of success 
probabilities, the real user is the one who has the highest 
probability among k users. For probabilities of the k users, 
they can be denoted as Pr = {pr1, pr2,…prk}, and the real 
user is the maximum in Pr. In order to find out the real user 
from them, the adversary has to compute the probabilities 
of each user and compare them to find out the highest one. 
Thus, if each user has the same probability, the adversary 
cannot find the highest probability, which makes the result 
guessed by profile correlation attack to be invalid, and the 
user's trajectory privacy will be preserved. Based on above 
analysis the definition of Lkθ privacy is proposed. 
Definition 1 Let L T∈ denote the sub-trajectory 
obtained by the adversary, and pL(c,t)denotes the profiles of 
query content and time interval mined from L. The scheme 
satisfies Lkθ privacy if and only if for any two uncertainty 
locations l and l’, there exist ( ) ( )’| |Pr l Pr l θ− ≤ , where
( ) ( ) (, , )( | ( ))’ ,c t c tL lPr l Pr l T sim p p= ∈ , θ is the differential 
probability. In this paper, θ is defined as 0. 
Based on definition 1, the basic idea of our solution 
was to generalize the correlation between sub-trajectory 
and subsequent locations, so that the successful 
probabilities of adversary guessing each user equal to each 
other. To this end, two basic conceptions are used. One 
conception is to employ a TTP, which is deployed in mix-
zone to gather query content and time interval of each user, 
and provides the identical profile set to each user. If users 
leave mix-zone, they will share the same query content set 
and time interval. However, this conception has to confront 
the drawbacks of TTP (e.g. single point of failure and 
bottleneck of services performance). Another conception is 
to transmit the profile information with collaborative users, 
and interchange the profile with each other to achieve the 
profile generalization. For the sake of drawbacks in TTP, 
this paper mainly chooses the collaboration user scheme, 
and assumes that the users can communicate with each 
other through short-range communication technology in 
mix-zone, but they cannot communicate with outsiders. 
For the purpose of illustration, continue to utilize the 
example of Alice and Bob in Fig. 2. As a subsequent 
location can be correlated with a confirmed sub-trajectory, 
the mix-zone is used to disturb the query content and time 
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interval of each leaver. With CoMix, subsequent locations 
are disturbed as triangles locating in sub-trajectories 
between n6-n7 as well as n6-n2. In spite of gaining sub-
trajectories between n5-n6 and n9-n6, the adversary utilizes 
the correlation attack to calculate the probabilities, but he 
cannot identify whether the current location belongs to 
Alice or Bob. The reason is that the similarity of profiles 














Figure 2 The result of exchanged profiles 
 
4 USERS COLLABORATIVE MIX-ZONE  
4.1 The Process of Exchanging Profiles 
 
The process of exchanging profiles has two 
consecutive phases, one phase is establishing exchanging 
group with collaborative users, and the other is sharing 








Figure 3 The exchanging group in mix-zone 
 
1) Phase of establishing exchanging group  
After entering mix-zone, the user broadcasts its request 
for profiles exchanging at any time before leaving. Then 
this user becomes a responder and he is no longer able to 
propose any requirement in this zone. If this request is 
responded by other users, this user can establish a 
collaborative group and exchange query content and time 
interval with them, so that he can achieve the profiles 
generalization. Otherwise, the user has to wait and respond 
to requirements of other users, and establishes exchanging 
group with them. For instance, in Fig. 3, b is a user driving 
in current mix-zone, and b broadcasts a request for 
establishing a group of exchanging. However, no user can 
respond to this request, as e is leaving this zone, and other 
users are all in its own group and cannot establish another 
anonymous group. Therefore, b becomes a responder of 
this zone, and has to wait and respond to other followers' 
requirements. This process is shown in Algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 1 illustrates the idea of establishing a group 
of exchanging in details. In this algorithm, line 2 confirms 
the addable of this group by checking its value, and this 
value is used to determine whether a user is leaving this 
zone. In 5-11, the algorithm calculates the number of users 
with received requirements, and then checks this member 
in current group to determine whether to reject the request. 
 
Algorithm 1: Establishing exchanging group 
Input: u, r// A new user and its requirement 
Output: G//The new exchanging group 
1 each user in G‘ receives r; 
2 if (addable==1); 
3     broadcast l=1;//this user does not leave the mix-zone 

















2) Phase of sharing profiles  
In the group of exchanging, users share their query 
contents and time intervals, and generate a similar query 
set as well as an equivalent time interval. The equivalent 
time is the greatest common divisor of every user's interval 
times. Finally, these users will have the similar query 
content and time interval. When leaving the mix-zone, each 
user requests the LBS with the similar profiles, until the 
requirement is terminated or the user enters into another 
mix-zone. If he enters another mix-zone, the user repeats 
above process, and sets up another group with its original 
query content and time interval. The process of sharing 
query content as well as generating interval times is shown 
in algorithm 2. 
 
Algorithm 2: Process of sharing query content and time interval 
Input: C, T//query content(bits) and time interval(seconds) set 
Output: C, T  
1 each user in G broadcast C and T; 
2 u chooses every user in G and gains their C and T; 
3 C=C+c; 
4 T=gcd(C,c);//computes the greatest common divisor 
5 u broadcast C and T; 
6 for other users in G 
7     update C and T; 
8 end 
 
In Algorithm 2, the group initiator first gathers other 
users' query contents and time intervals, then adds its own 
query content and computes the greatest common divisor 
of time intervals in line 3-4. In line 5-8, the initiator 
broadcasts the processing result set to this group, and 
everyone changes the query content and time interval, then 
users in this group will show a common profile when 
leaving this mix-zone. 
 
4.2 Security Analyses  
 
Security of CoMix is determined by the uncertainty of 
correlating a particular user. As the adversary can utilize 
correlation probabilities to identify subsequent locations, 
the main motivation is to generalize two profiles in the 
same group. To this end, entropy is utilized to measure the 
privacy level, which presents the uncertainty of correlating 
the sub-trajectory and subsequent locations. 
The resistance to correlation attacks of CoMix can be 
verified by a game played between challenger A and user 
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U. In this game, A prepares two trajectories (T0,T1), and 
gives them to U. U randomly chooses a number b∈{0,1} 
to indicate the chosen one, and generates a profiles 
message Msgb with query contents and time intervals 
shown in these two trajectories and sends it to A. The 
challenger will win the game if A can output a bit b'=b by 
the profile correlation attack. From this game, a definition 
demonstrates what kind of scheme can resistant the profile 
correlation attack is proposed. 
Definition 2 An algorithm is resistant to the profile 
correlation attack if for each subsequent location 
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Theorem 1 The CoMix is resistant to the profile 
correlation attack. 
Proof: For an arbitrary chosen location li out of the 
mix-zone, the probability of correlating it to the sub-
trajectory can be indicated as  
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Similarly, for another location lj from the same group, its 
probability of correlation is 
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Then for the pair of locations li and lj, Eq. (3) holds if  
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In the algorithm of CoMix, query content and time 
interval are converted into content set and the greatest 
common divisor of time intervals. The consistency 
guarantees that the user who leaves current mix-zone 
shows a similar profile with each other. It means that for 
any randomly chosen user, it will have the same probability 
to be correlated with the sub-trajectory by profiles 
similarity, and then Eq. (6) holds. Therefore, the scheme 
gains the maximum entropy, and the adversary has the 
highest uncertainty in determining which location belongs 




                                                            
1 http://dna.fernuni-hagen.de/secondo/BerlinMOD/BerlinMOD.html 
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
 
In this section, evaluations of CoMix on efficiency and 
effectiveness are proposed. The efficiency of performance 
is expressed by the process time and mix-zone size. Privacy 
effectiveness is depicted by entropy and the success cloak 
ratio. 
 
5.1 Evaluation Criteria and Metrics 
 
To evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness, the 
evaluation is implemented on a laptop with Intel Core i5 
1.70 GHz CPU, 4 GB RAM memory, and Windows 7×64 
ultimate operating system. Then the central part of the 
BerlinMOD Data Set 1  is used, and a randomly chosen 
intersection is used to deploy mix-zones. A set of 
trajectories is chosen and assumes they all passed the given 
mix-zone at a randomly chosen time.  
The process time is determined by the time of 
establishing the exchanging group and sharing the similar 
profiles. It was affected by the user number of current mix-
zone, so the evaluation of the efficiency of various 
algorithms has to assume that the user enters the mix-zone 
one after another and without leaving, so that the max time 
can be found in various forms of mix-zone. 
In general, a larger mix-zone may provide privacy for 
more users, but it will expend more deployment cost. 
Therefore, an appropriate mix-zone size is distinctly 
important to the tradeoff privacy and deployment cost. To 
this end, the size of the mix-zone is used to evaluate the 
performance of three different forms of mix-zone, and the 
optimal one will show the best performance.  
The success ratio of correlating subsequent locations 
depends on the disturbance of entering and leaving pairs as 
well as the disturbance of all leaving users. This condition 
makes the privacy level depend on the profile similarity 
between the entering and leaving users and the level of real 
user hidden behind others. Therefore, two different forms 
of entropy are used. Then combined with the correlation 
attack launched by passive or active adversaries, the 
entropy can be denoted as 
 
( ) / 2mount g lE E E= +                                                    (7) 
 
The success cloak ratio depends on the probability of 
encountering number of collaborative users. If no user was 
encountered in mix-zone, the user cannot establish the 
exchanging group. Thus, the success cloak ratio is 
calculated by the percentage of users successfully 
establishing the exchanging group, and it can be computed 
by 
 
| |/SCSR U S= ∑                                                           (8) 
 
where Us is the set of users successfully establishing the 
exchanging group, and S is the set of all users passed 
through this zone. In addition, higher success ratio 
corresponds to better privacy preservation. 
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5.2 Evaluation Results  
 
In Fig. 4, process time of three different types of mix-
zones is shown. Although all process times are ascending 
along with the increasing number of applicants, 
performance of shifted rectangular mix-zone is better than 
other two schemes, and the non-rectangular mix-zone is the 
worst. The reason is that with the process of establishing 
the exchanging group, some road segments cannot be 
covered by the non-rectangular mix-zone, which causes the 
number of users in current segments does not satisfy the 
anonymity degree, and users have to wait even longer for 
collaborative users in this type of zone. Additionally, as the 
inhomogeneous distribution of collaborative users, the 
shifted rectangular mix-zone can shift to the dense 




Figure 4 The process time 
 
 
Figure 5 The mix-zone size 
 
Fig. 5 shows the size of mix-zones followed with the 
increasing number of applicants. From this figure, the 
shifted rectangular mix-zone performs better than the other 
two, the rectangular one is worse only a little, but the non-
rectangular one is the worst. This is because of that the 
mix-zone needs to provide enough space for covering more 
adjacent users, so the number of users in a certain period 
determines the size. This condition leads the failure of non-
rectangular mix-zone, as the passing velocity of users 
changes its shape. With a higher velocity, it is harder for 
this zone to contain more users. Therefore, in order to 
provide services to all users in current region, this type of 
mix-zone has to be expanded even larger. 
In general, entropy is used to ensure that the 
distribution of the mapping probabilities does not deviate 
much from the uniform distribution. Fig. 6 shows the 
pairwise entropy of users, which presents the degree of 
considering the profile given to a particular user. In this 
figure, CoMix is a bit less than the maximum entropy in 
theory, because this paper mainly considers the correlation 
of query content and time interval, and there will be other 
attack types utilized by the adversary. 
 
 
Figure 6 The pairwise entropy  
 
 
Figure 7 The entropy of subsequent locations 
 
Fig. 7 shows the entropy of subsequent locations, it is 
computed with the locations of users in the same 
exchanging group. Generally, the entropy is increasing 
with the uncertainty of correlation between subsequent 
locations and sub-trajectory. The baseline is the highest 
entropy (log2k), but our algorithm does not reach that. It is 
because of that the user passing through the mix-zone 
without encountering any collaborative user influences the 
entropy as the user fails to establish the exchanging group. 
Fig. 8 shows the success cloak ratio of a user 
exchanges profile with collaborative users. In this figure, 
the success ratio is ascending with the increasing of 
resident time. This is because a longer residence time leads 
to a higher probability to encounter with collaborative 
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users. Besides the above phenomenon, this figure also 
shows another interesting phenomenon. With the 
increasing number of users passing through the mix-zone, 
the success ratio of exchanging profiles is decreasing, and 
more users are passing through the lower of this ratio. The 
reason is that the possibility of meeting collaborative users 
is an independent random event and it does not depend on 
the residence time. Thus, more users passing through the 




Figure 8 The success cloak ratio 
 
6 CONCLUSION  
 
In this paper, an algorithm to resist the profile 
correlation attack is proposed. As query contents and time 
intervals are exchanged with collaborative users in the mix-
zone, each user shows a similar profile, and the similar 
profile makes the adversary difficult to identify a particular 
user by profile correlation attack. Then, the entropy and the 
success cloak ratio are utilized to measure the privacy level, 
and the security of CoMix is analyzed. Finally, evaluation 
results show CoMix has a better efficiency and 
effectiveness in preservation and performance. However, 
there are still some problems unsolved in our algorithm 
such as the adversary can correlate the subsequence 
locations with the undiscovered profile as well as the 
insufficient collaborative users will reduce the success 
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